The defendant, identified as D.I., born in 1976, maintained a long career within the NBU system from 2006 until August 2024. In his most recent role as the head of the Bankcards and Retail Operations Department for the regional branch, he supervised the management of plastic cards, ATMs, and their corresponding software infrastructure. Investigators established that he systematically manipulated his official credentials and accessed the bank’s automated information system (IABS) to siphon off funds belonging to both the financial institution and its depositors.
Exploiting the UzCard-to-Humo transition
The fraudulent scheme began taking shape in 2019 during a nationwide banking transition. Due to recurring technical glitches associated with UzCard plastic cards, commercial banks began phasing them out in favor of the Humo payment system. Branch staff were tasked with manually transferring balances from obsolete UzCards to newly issued Humo accounts.
D.I. exploited a temporary vulnerability in the software during this migration window. Utilizing his personal login credentials alongside those assigned to subordinates within his department, he authorized balance transfers through the IABS system. However, before the centralized network data could fully synchronize and log the updates, he diverted the funds into accounts under his control and withdrew the cash for personal use. Court testimonies revealed that between 2019 and 2024, the defendant progressively stole more than UZS 641 million from the accounts of 113 unsuspecting clients, masking the thefts as "unprocessed transactions" in the bank's internal ledger.
Tampering with ATMs using razor blades and glue
Beyond digital manipulation, D.I. engaged in physical theft from the bank's cash machines. When a new batch of ATMs was delivered to the branch, he secretly made duplicate copies of the outer chassis and inner safe keys, keeping them in his possession for years. Under standard operating protocols, ATM keys must exist in three copies: one held by security services, one kept at the cash desk, and a backup stored securely at a partner bank.
His illicit activities came to light in December 2024 when executive leadership established a special internal task force to audit cash balances and verify financial records across self-service devices under the "Farg’ona Amaliyot" banking services center. To prevent the coordinator from hiding discrepancies, the task force halted operations at all regional ATMs simultaneously for a comprehensive physical count.
The audit exposed seven unauthorized extractions performed by D.I. between April and December 2023 at ATMs located around the "Farg’ona Dehqon Bozori" (Fergana Farmers Market), resulting in a direct loss of UZS 845.02 million for the bank.
