HTS’s influence on the security of Central Asia: Rising threats and strategic alliances

From Damascus to Berlin, Syrians celebrated the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime on December 8, marking the end of a family dynasty that had ruled the Syrian Arab Republic since 1971. While the dictator’s ousting may bring celebrations among the people and positive reactions from the international community, in the case of Syria, it also exacerbates security challenges for the Central Asian region.

Abu Muhammad al-Jolani’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), by capturing the Syrian capital, Damascus, marked a significant turning point in the history of the country’s civil war. While it is far too early to speak of an end to the conflict or the establishment of a stable government in the Syrian Arab Republic, it is already clear that al-Jolani and HTS have emerged as central players in shaping Syria’s future. This development raises critical questions: How did HTS rise to prominence? How does its influence threaten the security of Central Asia? What can we expect regarding Central Asian security in response?

The rise and evolution of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham

The emergence of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham must be understood in the context of Syria's descent into chaos following the Arab Spring protests of 2011. What began as peaceful demonstrations against President Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime turned into a civil war when the regime responded with violent repression. The collapse of state authority created a security vacuum that militant groups quickly exploited. Meanwhile, the Assad regime, supported by Russia and Iran, launched aggressive campaigns to reclaim territory, targeting opposition forces. Amid this instability, jihadist factions gained influence by offering governance and services, allowing HTS to rise as a dominant force in northwest Syria.

HTS traces its origins to Jabhat al-Nusra, which was formed in 2012 by Abu Muhammad al-Jolani under the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). Jabhat al-Nusra initially acted as ISI's Syrian branch, receiving significant financial and logistical support from ISI. The group quickly gained prominence through effective tactics and local support but split from ISI in 2013 after rejecting Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s call for a merger into ISIS in order to gain local credibility. Jabhat al-Nusra instead aligned with al-Qaeda, resulting in a rivalry with ISIS.

Under al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra consolidated its influence but faced numerous challenges, including U.S. airstrikes and defections. In 2016, Jolani rebranded Jabhat al-Nusra as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, claiming to sever ties with al-Qaeda to gain broader acceptance within the Syrian opposition. In 2017, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham merged with other factions to form HTS, marking a shift towards a locally focused agenda. HTS abandoned al-Qaeda’s global jihadist goals, instead concentrating on overthrowing Assad and governing Idlib through its "Syrian Salvation Government." HTS established strict control over Idlib, enforcing Sharia law, managing civilian affairs, and eliminating rivals.

Jihadist alliances: HTS in Central Asia

Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), even claims the opposite, still has ongoing ties to al-Qaeda, poses a potential security concern for Central Asia due to its strategic alliances and established presence in Afghanistan. While HTS publicly distanced itself from al-Qaeda in 2017, it continues to maintain ideological and operational links with al-Qaeda and its affiliates. These relationships extend beyond Syria and have broader implications for Central Asia, where HTS’s allied groups are seeking to expand their reach.

In Syria, HTS has developed significant cooperation with al-Qaeda-linked groups, particularly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, also known as the Islamic Party of Turkestan (IPT). IPT before the fall of the Assad regime, operated mainly in the governorates of Idlib, northeastern Latakia, northern Hama, and western Aleppo, areas where HTS had considerable influence. Together, these groups had carried out joint attacks against Syrian government forces, with HTS providing both financial and logistical support to IPT. This partnership has implications for Central Asia, as IPT focuses on separatist activities in the Xinjiang region of China and seeks to promote the idea of an Islamic caliphate in the Turkestan-Central Asia region. This is particularly concerning given that IPT has already carried out a terrorist attack in Kyrgyzstan.

The increasing collaboration between HTS and IPT is evident in their joint operations and shared resources. IPT receives financial support from HTS, and through various entrepreneurial activities in the region, including in Turkey. HTS also assists IPT in training foreign fighters. The growing sophistication of IPT’s tactics, such as the development and use of unmanned aerial systems (drones), is a testament to the technological advancements being made with HTS’s support, which brings new calls for regional security.

Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (KTJ) is a jihadist group formed in 2013 by Sirojiddin Mukhtarov from Uzbekistan, composed mainly of fighters from Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. Before the regime's fall in Syria, KTJ primarily operated in Idlib Province, where it maintained a close affiliation with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. HTS plays a central role in supporting KTJ, providing the group with resources, strategic guidance, and integration into the broader jihadist network in Syria. This partnership strengthens KTJ’s position within the region, allowing it to participate in joint operations alongside HTS and other aligned groups.

Although KTJ is focused on local jihadist goals in Syria, it has also been responsible for external attacks, including the 2017 Saint Petersburg metro bombing and, in cooperation with IPT, the 2016 suicide car bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Despite its focus on Syria, KTJ’s close ties to HTS and its involvement in global jihadist operations highlight the ongoing threat posed by this collaboration to both the region and international security.

The ongoing situation in Afghanistan underscores the significant role of HTS within the broader jihadist network. In particular, concerns are rising about the movement of foreign fighters to Afghanistan. According to a UN Security Council report, there has been an increase in individuals traveling to Afghanistan from Central Asia, Arab countries, and even India, many of whom are believed to have previously trained or fought in Syria with HTS or al-Qaeda-aligned groups. This movement exacerbates the potential threat to Central Asia, as these fighters bring new skills and knowledge back to the region, which could be used in attacks or the establishment of new jihadist cells.

Al-Qaeda's Arab operative Abdul Azim Ali Musa Bin Ali, a Libyan national and a key figure in the 2012 Benghazi attack plot, also relocated to Afghanistan. According to Sarah Adams, former CIA officer and author of the book Benghazi: Know Thy Enemy, in November 2021, Musa brokered a critical meeting that facilitated HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani's travel to Afghanistan. During this visit, al-Jolani met with Sirajuddin Haqqani, the acting Interior Minister and Mullah Yaqoob, the acting Minister of Defense. This meeting played a key role in facilitating safe passage and training for foreign fighters in Afghanistan. Prior to 2021, regional terrorists from Afghanistan and Pakistan relied on smuggling routes to reach Syria and join the conflict. However, this meeting established a more organized pipeline and a strategic alliance between HTS, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban, further solidifying their cooperation.

The plan emerging from this meeting had three key components, all implemented:

1. Reviving the Shura Ittihad al-Mujahedeen (Allied Mujahedeen Council), originally formed under Osama bin Laden, along with the fathers of Sirajuddin Haqqani and Yaqoob, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and Mullah Omar, this council is now led by al-Qaeda commander Hamid Yusuf and is based in Badakhshan Province. The council includes not only al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and HTS but also the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and IPT, ensuring effective coordination among these groups.

2. Training HTS Brigades in Afghanistan: Two HTS brigades — the Omar bin al-Khattab Brigade and the Saad bin Abi Waqqas Brigade — are now training and operating inside Afghanistan. Around 1,500 HTS fighters are said to be active in Afghanistan.

3. Establishing a Terrorist Pipeline: A secure route through Afghanistan was a crucial element of the plan, facilitating the movement of Afghan recruits and foreign fighters to support HTS and al-Qaeda’s operations in Syria. This pipeline helps sustain their activities by enabling the steady influx of fighters from the region.

In summary, the continued cooperation between Taliban, al-Qaeda and HTS plays a significant part in shaping the security landscape of Central Asia, contributing to an escalating and persistent threat to the region. HTS affiliated groups like IPT, Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are expanding their influence and resources in Central Asia’s southern borders. HTS plays a central role in expanding the reach of jihadist movements across the region, the use of innovative technologies, training tactics, and recruitment efforts, heightening the risk of insurgencies and terrorist activities in the coming years.

What to expect: Uzbekistan’s immunity to security threats

Uzbekistan has already demonstrated its ability to closely monitor events beyond its borders, formulate foreign policy, and prepare for potential changes and risks in the region. The Uzbek government, ahead of all other countries in the region, recognized the Taliban as an important actor in Afghanistan and engaged with the group even before the reemergence of its government in August 2021. As a result, Uzbekistan was well-prepared for the fall of the US-backed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and, under the direction of President Mirziyoyev, strengthened its previously established contacts.

In addition, Uzbekistan carried out preventive operations under the name "Safe Zone" across the republic, and the arrest of jihadists was announced shortly after the political change in Afghanistan. In the long term, by developing transnational projects, investing in Afghanistan, and improving trade, Uzbekistan is contributing to the development and stability of Afghanistan. The two countries aim to achieve a $1 billion trade turnover by the end of 2024.

In Syria, HTS has become a leading force in dismantling Assad’s regime and is now a key player in the future government-building process. Supported by Central Asian jihadi groups such as IPT and Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, these groups have gained access to cross-border transportation, expertise, and advanced technologies like unmanned aerial systems (drones). HTS’s success in Syria has inspired jihadi groups across the region. Additionally, discussions about HTS’s potential legitimization and removal from the terrorist list are gaining traction. The group's support from Turkey and its role in ending Assad’s ethno-clan monopoly of power may foster a positive view among Uzbek people, who share solidarity with the Turkish government and Sunni Muslims in Syria. This could potentially align them with the ideas and values HTS promotes. The Uzbek government has proactively responded to this matter by issuing a clear message and raising awareness among citizens that HTS and its Central Asian-related alliances remain terrorist organizations, and their ideologies are against the constitutional order and statehood.

An Uzbek citizen, who had been conducting propaganda on social media from Syria’s Idlib, is facing a criminal case announced by the Ministry of Internal Affairs on December 10. He is charged with undermining the constitutional order, engaging in terrorist activities, and other offenses. The Ministry explained that in 2016, H.N. traveled to Russia as a labor migrant, was influenced by terrorist groups, and later went to Idlib. His propaganda led several Uzbek citizens to join the conflict and lose their lives. H.N. continues to incite jihad via social media, justifying his actions with religious rhetoric. His social media pages have been banned in Uzbekistan.

In addition, Uzbekistan is strengthening its legal framework to prevent attempts at destabilization within the country. On December 11, the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis approved, in its first reading, a draft law amending Article 244 of the Criminal Code on Mass Riots. The amendments establish liability for participating in training aimed at organizing mass riots and for financing such activities. Deputy Prosecutor General Svetlana Artikova emphasized that these provisions will also apply to individuals participating in online training sessions. She commented on the amendment, stating that in these turbulent times, we must be capable of defending individuals, society, and our statehood.

Russia’s strategic opportunity amidst turmoil

Russia was a key military supporter of Assad, helping to secure his regime's survival amid the rise of anti-Assad forces backed since the beginning of the Syrian civil war. With its priority on the war in Ukraine, Russia is currently mostly focused on the future of its military bases in Syria, which are central to its strategic interests in the region. However, this does not mark the end of its countermeasures against HTS. On its own soil, Russia is countering jihadi activities by HTS members and the financing of the organization. Given that labor migrants from Central Asian republics have been implicated in these commitments, Russia will strengthen security and military cooperation with Central Asian countries.

Earlier, following the meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Council of Ministers of Defense in November 2024, CIS Secretary General S. Lebedev emphasized the growing complexity of the tasks facing the Council due to changes in the international situation. He highlighted the need to expand cooperation and conduct joint activities involving the relevant structures of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to effectively address these challenges. Lebedev also announced that the CIS Executive Committee had fully supported the CSTO Secretariat's proposal to create a joint working group, consisting of representatives from the relevant structures of these organizations, to develop a comprehensive plan for establishing a security belt around Afghanistan.

In December 2024, the CIS Council of Heads of Government convened in Moscow and resolved to allocate funds in 2025 for the establishment and development of a unified air defense system among Commonwealth states. The meeting, chaired by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, was also attended by Uzbekistan’s Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov.

Since Uzbekistan is not a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, the CIS could serve as a platform for Russia to deepen its regional security involvement with Uzbekistan. Despite Uzbekistan's firm stance on not joining military alliances or allowing foreign bases on its territory, the CIS could be used as an extension of the CSTO, especially in light of the potential threat posed by HTS’s success in Syria, which strengthens its allied groups with ambitions directed toward Central Asia.

China's business security challenges

China has actively engaged Central Asia through bilateral agreements and its institutional role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Its focus on counterterrorism, military training, and intelligence sharing complements its role as the region’s primary trade partner.

From 2016 to 2020, China was Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner. Though briefly overtaken by Russia during the pandemic in 2021 and 2022, China reclaimed the top spot in early 2023 and has maintained it since. Uzbekistan’s trade turnover with China reached $10.23 billion for the first 10 months of 2024. As of September 1, nearly 3,000 enterprises with Chinese capital were operating in Uzbekistan, according to the State Statistics Agency.

However, as China’s investments in Central Asia have grown, so have its security challenges. Clashes at Kyrgyz industrial sites in 2014 and 2019, the 2016 Chinese embassy bombing in Bishkek, and frequent anti-China protests in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have underscored these vulnerabilities. In response, Chinese companies have increasingly relied on private security contractors (PSCs), which now operate in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The recent killing of a Chinese national and injuries to four others in a cross-border attack in southern Tajikistan in November 2024 further highlights these risks. The attackers reportedly crossed from Afghanistan, though it remains unclear whether they were criminals involved in drug trafficking or members of a militant group. The Chinese nationals were working at a gold mine in Tajikistan’s Khatlon province. This incident underscores the vulnerability of the Afghan border and the security risks faced by Chinese investments and citizens in the region.

While Uzbekistan offers a comparatively safer business environment, its legislation prohibits foreign individuals and organizations, including PSCs, from providing security services, except for safeguarding high-level guests on short-term visits. However, the growing threat of Uzbek and Chinese citizens joining jihadist groups like IPT and Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad under HTS’s umbrella could spark discussions about enhanced security cooperation. This may include the possible introduction of Chinese PSCs or other measures to secure Chinese enterprises in Uzbekistan.

Conclusion

While the rise of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its associated jihadist groups in Syria and Afghanistan poses a growing security challenge to Central Asia, the likelihood of large-scale military incursions into the region remains low. The Taliban has consistently assured neighboring countries that no threats would emanate from Afghanistan since it assumed power in August 2021, reiterating this stance during bilateral diplomatic discussions. The de facto Afghan government values its evolving relations with Central Asian states and aims to benefit from foreign investments, as well as trans-Afghan railway and energy projects. Consequently, it is unlikely to provoke direct conflict by allowing jihadi groups to conduct cross-border attacks.

However, the increasing success of HTS and its affiliates could inspire local jihadist recruitment, potentially leading to the creation of terrorist cells and attempts to carry out hostile incidents within Central Asia. The activities of jihadist groups could also harm the region’s reputation, particularly amid efforts to diversify foreign labor destinations. Central Asian labor migrants, who have faced discriminatory behavior in Russia and instances of recruitment into the war in Ukraine, could become further stigmatized. For example, after the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall in Moscow in March 2024 and the killing of an Israeli-Moldovan rabbi in the United Arab Emirates in November 2024, Uzbek citizens faced deportation and entry refusals from Russia, Turkey, and the UAE.

This growing risk underscores the need for Central Asian governments to not only bolster domestic security measures but also enhance their cooperation with global and regional powers. Russia and China are likely to deepen their security involvement in the region, but Central Asian states should take the initiative in strengthening regional defense frameworks and counterterrorism operations. Additionally, engaging with multilateral platforms such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO member states would strengthen the response to these emerging threats while allowing Uzbekistan to maintain its non-military alliance policy.

Moreover, Central Asian governments must simultaneously invest in strengthening societal immunity against extremist ideologies by promoting political stability, improving economic opportunities, and addressing underlying grievances that may fuel radicalization. By adopting a holistic approach that combines security, ideological resilience, and multilateral cooperation, the region can mitigate the risks posed by HTS and other jihadist organizations, ensuring long-term stability in an increasingly complex security environment.

Anvar Kodirov